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Arie C. Glebbeek &  Erik H. Bax∗
SOM-theme A: Primary processes within firms

In this article we test the hypothesis that the relationship between labour turnover and the
economic performance of the firm is bell-shaped: a turnover level too low has a negative
effect and likewise does a level too high. Our analysis is based on economic performance data
of 110 offices of a temp agency. Since these offices vary highly in labour turnover but are
similar in product and operational management, the data enabled us to control for a number of
important intervening variables. From a regression analysis it could be shown that labour
turnover indeed is related to office performance in a curvilinear way, indicating that it is
especially excessive turnover that matters. This result proved robust for both performance
level and change of performance as the dependent variables.
                                                     
∗
 The authors thank Germaine van Bree, Hans Ooteman and Raymond L. Schikhof for their
assistance in collecting the data and Peter van der Meer and Eric Molleman for their critical
remarks on an earlier draft of this article.

1Management’s interest in labor turnover is strongly related to the business cycle
(Gaudet, 1960; Pettman, 1975). Under conditions of economic decline when the
demand for labor is decreasing, turnover is not so much considered a problem, as
rather a blessing for the prosperity of the individual, the firm and society. Thus, in the
1980s when western economies saw high unemployment rates, one could observe the
rise of outplacement agencies, mobility centers, the promotion of ‘employability’ and
the destruction of internal labor markets. Some writers even sensed the wake of a
jobless economy (Bridges, 1994). In the 1990s , when the labor market became tenser
and labor scarcity grew, the emphasis shifted towards the detrimental effects of
turnover (White, 1995; Branch, 1998; Moody, 2000; Stein, 2000). The inescapable
message of the consultants’ literature was that the costs of labor turnover were
considerable: ranging from 50 per cent of an annual salary till 175 per cent in case of
some IT and marketing experts (Buckingham, 2000). Such publications show only a
one-sided interest in the costs of labor turnover and neglect other effects.
Additionally, in most cases the claims put forward also lack an empirical basis. This
article aims to contribute to the empirical analysis of the effects of labor turnover.
The research literature on labor turnover is dominated by analyses in which labor
turnover is treated as the variable (e.g. Lee & Mowday, 1987; O’Reilly et
al., 1989; Van Breukelen, 1991; Anderson & Meyer, 1994; Griffeth & Hom 1995;
Huselid, 1995; Morrow et al., 1999). Generally the researchers draw on some
empirical measurement of actual labor turnover, or they use an indicator such as the
intention to leave the job. In the latter case one debates whether the indicator used is
valid or not (Steel & Ovalle, 1984; Sager et al., 1998).
Studies that take labor turnover as an  variable are relatively scarce.
The publications on the costs of labor turnover that are available mostly only convey
a normative message. They often aim at presenting different dimensions of costs and
formulas for how to do the accounting, but generally lack a quantitative analysis of
the effects on firm performance. (Gaudet, 1960; Flamholtz, 1974; Cawsey & Wedley,
1979; Blakeslee et al., 1985; Tziner & Birati, 1996). This unbalance in the research of
labor turnover was already noted as early as 1982 by Mobley who wrote that ‘relative
2to the causes of turnover, consequences have been underemphasized’ (Mobley, 1982:
31). In 1980 Staw explicitly pointed to the potential danger of a research practice
concentrating on the causes of labor turnover while neglecting its effects: such
research is based on the assumption that turnover is an important organizational
problem and, consequently, should be reduced. Hence, potential positive effects for
the organization are overlooked (Staw, 1980). In the decades to follow the research on
turnover did not change its direction. Similar to Staw’s analysis from 1980, nine years
later Mueller and Price (1989: 389) again pleaded for research into the consequences
of turnover rather than into its determinants. Nevertheless, in the 1999 special issue
on labor turnover of the 	
	
 (1999) all papers treat
turnover as a dependent variable and none as an independent one. “While thousands
of studies have investigated why employees choose to leave their jobs, very little
research has directly examined the organizational consequences associated with
voluntary employee turnover”, Williams (1999: 549) complains in this issue. And:
“While there is an immense literature covering the subject of personnel turnover,
there is a paucity of writing on the impact of turnover on the organisation”
(Hutchinson et al., 1997, 3202). It is significant that both Williams and Hutchinson
mention not even one relevant title. Even a recently conducted meta-analysis of the
domain – ‘a final review of turnover research conducted in the 20th century’ – is
explicitly limited to the antecedents of turnover and not paying any attention to its
effects (Griffeth et al., 2000). We cannot agree more with the observation of
Hutchinson et al. that “(t)his dearth of studies on the impact of turnover is especially
surprising, since it is presumably the assumed impact of turnover on organisational
effectiveness which has prompted so much turnover research in the first place”
(Hutchinson et al., 1997: 3203).
Only two recent studies report – more or less as a side effect of the main research
question – on the effects of turnover. So for Koys (2001) the main problem is the
direction of the relation between HR-practices and firm performance in a chain of
restaurants. He found negative correlation coefficients between labor turnover and
restaurant profitability varying from –.20 to –.28 (Koys, 2001: 109, table 1). In a
multivariate test he found the same negative relationship but the regression coefficient
3was not significant, probably due to the low number of observations (only 28
restaurants were involved). In a study of the effects of changes in the model of
industrial relations of emergent Silicon Valley enterprises, Baron, Hannan & Burton
(2001) checked for the relation between labor turnover and firm performance. They
analyzed 54 companies and gave bigger companies a larger weight than smaller ones.
As a result of this weighted regression, they found a significantly negative effect. The
authors themselves labeled their analysis rightfully as ‘preliminary’ because it lacks a
control for sickness absenteeism nor did they answer the question whether the effects
of turnover were linear or only manifest beyond a certain level.
In conclusion, a tradition of empirical research into the effects of labor turnover
is vitally non-existent. Probably this is because the necessary data on the firm level
are difficult to obtain, let alone that such data enable the researcher to control for
spurious relations. In the next section, we put forward the theoretical arguments why
the outcome of turnover is a priori uncertain in terms of costs and benefits. The data,
variables and the regression model are specified in the third section on methods. The




Generally, all costs related to the leaving and replacement of employees can be
considered to be costs of labor turnover. These embrace not only the costs of
recruitment and selection. As early as 1960, Gaudet (1960: 39-47) put forward a
rather comprehensive list of turnover costs with items such as advertising, college
recruiting, applicant’s travel expenses, medical examinations and psychological
testing, recruitment awards for employees, and ‘hotel entertainment’. The costs of
these items can be accounted for, and the same roughly holds for the loss of sales
because of vacancies and higher average pay due to extra overtime. More difficult to
4estimate are the extra expenditures for training and learning contextual skills, because
these include also the costs of coaching, supervision and the loss of quality and
product output.  Even more complicated is the accounting for items like the loss of
team productivity, the loss of effectiveness of informal communication and co-
ordination processes and a decreased motivation of those employees who are left
behind (Mobley, 1982: 20-21). Sailors & Sylvestre (1994: 32) estimated the costs of
labor turnover to US companies “to be several billion dollars per year” of which 20
per cent consists of direct turnover costs and 80 per cent of costs that can be
associated but are not directly visible.
A particular perspective on the negative effects of turnover is provided by the
resource-based theory of strategic human resource management (Prahalad & Hamel,
1990; Barney, 1991; Ulrich, 1991) and the related ideas on high commitment HRM
(Beer et. al., 1984; Guest, 1997). According to these theories, a motivated workforce
can really make a difference when competing in the market. Dedication to the
organization’s goals, knowledge of the firm’s internal processes, its suppliers and
customer relations is supposed to produce high performance (Herman, 1997). A high
turnover rate is contradictory to high performance because it shows that one of the
core conditions of high performance – i.e. a highly committed workforce – is not met.
Additionally, high commitment HRM requires long periods of training and
socialization. Consequently, it will take more time before the break-even point
between investments in human capital and the returns to these investments is reached.
Therefore, in a context of high commitment HRM the costs of labor turnover will be
relatively high.
 !"""#$
The following potential advantages of labor turnover could be listed:
1.     
. This applies especially in case a firm
uses a compensation system based on seniority or if the premiums for social
security are age related. If the rise of labor costs exceeds the increase of
productivity of an employee, replacement of the latter becomes profitable.
52. 	
. This refers to workers who loose productivity




. Even under the conditions of careful recruitment and
selection procedures, some matches turn out to be better than others. This holds
especially when productivity and performance do not so much depend on
technology as well as on social relations and contextual skills (McEvoy & Cascio,
1987).
4. . Labor turnover creates possibilities for replacing employees and




 . The personnel demand of a firm is dependent on
external conditions of which the market and the business cycle are important
ones. Hence, some variation in the number of staff employed is inevitable.
Compulsory redundancies may lead to substantial costs because of severance
pays and may weaken the psychological contract with those workers who leave
behind. A sufficient amount of ‘natural’ labor turnover may facilitate these
adjustments.
6. !    
 . Internal labor markets provide the
opportunities for career development of employees and are therefore an important
instrument for motivation, the more if productivity is not easy to measure in the
short run (Baron & Kreps, 1999: 171-172). Turnover creates the vacancies
required for the internal labor market to function properly.
7. "	. Labor turnover is the price organizations have to pay for the
employment of young highly skilled and well-educated professionals. Although
these ‘job hoppers’ will leave the organization inevitably, during their stay they
contribute significantly to the organization’s success. Prevention of this kind of
turnover would be the employment of more ‘average’ employees who are less
attracted by the external labor market (Cappelli, 2000).
6%& '""
The arguments above lead to the conclusion that a traditional and negative evaluation
of labor turnover as ‘… a continuous and fruitless interchange of workers between
firms’ (Gaudet, 1960: 64) is no longer valid.  Reality shows that many firms have left
the model of fostering commitment by long term employment relationships and have
now invested in more flexible ties with their employees (Cappelli et. al, 1997; Kochan
& Osterman, 1994).
Our preliminary conclusion is that only labor turnover beyond a particular degree
may be a problem for individual firms. We have three basic arguments for this
statement. First, the costs of ‘normal’ turnover are an accepted part of the industry’s
production costs passed on to the consumers. Secondly, if turnover has not only
disadvantages there may well be a turnover level where the advantages of turnover
surpass the disadvantages to the extent that the organization would favor from a
higher turnover rate. Thirdly, excessive turnover may be part of a wider bundle of
problems in the organization. This implies that e.g. financial losses correlated with
labor turnover need not to be produced by it .
Hence, we present the hypothesis that the relationship between labor turnover
and firm performance is 	 and probably even  : a level of
turnover too low has a negative effect on performance and likewise does a level too
high. The precise shape of the bell (steep, flat, normal or skew) and its exact position
in the field (more to the left or to the right) depends on many factors and is firm and
industry specific. Therefore, for management the crucial task is to judge on what
point of the curve the organization is presently located. For analytical purposes we
split this hypothesis in two separate parts:












Our data originate from a temporary job agency with offices all over the Netherlands.
It is medium sized and operates in the Dutch labor market since the late 1960s. The
company functions in a highly competitive and dynamic segment of the private
service sector. The last fifteen years the volume of the business of temping increased
substantially. Compared to a decade earlier, in 1996 – the mid of the period under
study – the annual number of hours of temporary employment in the Netherlands had
doubled to 306 million: 219,000 temp jobs – of which two-third full time jobs –
involving 750,000 temporary workers (source: Statistics Netherlands). The total
number of temp jobs equaled 3.5 per cent of total Dutch employment. The latter
figure demonstrates that in 1996 the Netherlands, together with the UK, were the
frontrunners of temp work in the EU where in that same year the average percentage
of temp jobs was only 1.2 (Peeters, 1999: 77).
The management of the organization we studied was convinced to be on the
right-hand side of the top of the bell. Labor turnover was indeed an issue. In the
period 1995-1997 it was on average 16 per cent and had risen to 18 per cent in 1998.
In the latter year, a quarter of all offices had turnover percentages of more than 25 per
cent, some even more than 40 per cent. In its 1999 Plan of Operations top
management complained that “a turnover rate too high jeopardizes the quality of
service and costs a lot of money”. It formulated the policy target to decrease turnover
with one third in 1999. Ironically, the performance of the organization studied is
largely dependent on the labor turnover in other firms, as its product is the
deployment of temporary workers. However, similar to other firms, the agency feels
8that it has to gain by a loyal and experienced staff. The latter are the subject of our
study: intermediaries, supervisors, office managers, support staff and the like.

The offices of the temp agency vary highly in labor turnover but are similar in
product and operational management. Because of the similarity of the offices a
number of factors potentially affecting turnover effects are kept constant. Hence, this
setting allows for testing the hypothesized relationship(s) between labor turnover and
firm performance. The data set enables us also to control for a number of important
intervening variables, most notably sickness absenteeism. The company involved is
typical for the modern service sector. As Dutch trade and industry is not deviant from
those in other present-day Western market economies, we have no reason to believe
that the impact of turnover is different either (Van Breukelen, 1989, 1991).
In the period to which our data refer, 1995-1998, the agency’s average volume of
daily working temp employees increased from 18,500 till 39,000. In the same period,
the population of the agency’s staff (managers, intermediaries and the like) grew from
667 until 1,894 employees. Our units of observation are those offices active during
the  period 1995-1998. Offices that became active (about 100) or stopped (2)
their activities in one of the years studied were left out of the analysis. We also
deleted one office with a turnover percentage of zero as we considered it an artificial
bias: the office was primarily active in an area dominated by seasonal employment
and attracted its necessary staff on a temporary basis from other offices. In sum total,
we applied the analysis to 110 offices.
We used several data sources. Data on the financial performances of the offices
were taken from the central accounts of the holding. Data on the number of temp
hours, the number of persons employed, sickness absenteeism and labor turnover
come from the automated personnel files of the holding. So, in all cases we use the
official statistical records of the firm.
9""
)"&")" !$*". The labor turnover of an office is measured as the total
number of employees leaving that office per year as a percentage of the average
number of employees employed that year in that office. In this measure ‘employee’ is
defined as a person and not as (part of) a full time equivalent (fte). The average
number of office-staff employed per office per year is accounted for by measuring on
three dates: January 1st, July 1st and December 31st and dividing the sum total by
three. District managers, supporting staff at district level and all other personnel not
engaged in operational functions are excluded from the analyses; they are also
excluded from the labor turnover figures.
"&")" !$*"+Because of the above-mentioned problems of specifying the
costs of labor turnover, we have chosen to take the economicperformance of an
office as a measure of the effects of labor turnover (cf. Staw, 1980). An additional
argument to follow this strategy is that we do not want to exclude the possibility that
labor turnover may also yield an advantage or profit. This dependent variable is more
complicated to indicate than the independent one. Temp-agencies usually measure





	 ‘sold’ by an office. Next, this number is related to the number of
full-time staff equivalents (fte) used to achieve this ‘production’. The consequent
ratio is the productivity per fte of the office involved.  Disadvantage of this
conventional measure is that it does not allow drawing conclusions on the economic
performance of the office. A linkage between the quantity of hours sold and the price
realized is missing; e.g. the differentiation between hours sold at a price of  $ 10 and
those of $ 50 is lost in the ratio.
The second measure is the annual  made by an office. This figure equals the
total number of temp hours multiplied by the price per hour. Similarly to the first
measure, one can consequently account the sales per fte, which then can be used to
compare an office with other offices. Contrary to the first measure, here the link
between number of hours sold and the realized prices are expressed in the ratio.
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However, insight into the profitability is still lacking: even if an office produces
below the break-even point, sales may be impressive.
The third measure, the 	 of an office, provides the desired insight into
profitability because it equals the sales (second measure) minus the direct wage costs
of the temp workers involved. However, it does not include other important costs like
the wage costs of office staff, housing costs, publicity costs and the like.  This is the
more a disadvantage as the wage costs of the office staff are directly related to the
level of turnover, the present issue of interest.
In order to meet these problems we developed a fourth measure, the  	 
. Taking the gross result per office and subtracting the wage costs of the office
staff constructs this measure. To get a full picture of an office’s contribution to the
firm’s profit one should also take into account the overhead costs made for housing,
publicity and the like. We did not do so here because the office staff cannot influence
the bulk of these costs therefore having no clear meaning for the performance of the
office. Against this, one could rightfully put forward the criticism that turnover-
related costs like those for recruitment and selection are now hidden behind the label
‘overhead’. However, given the structure of the data available, these latter costs could
not be separately specified. Consequently, because the results of the offices with a
relatively high level of recruitment and selection activities will be estimated as too
positive, any potential bias resulting from this procedure will be conservative in
nature: it distracts from the hypothesized relationship.  Therefore, although our
measure is not perfect to the highest degree, it suits our purpose well enough, the
more as it embraces all ‘hidden costs’ of labor turnover that, as we discussed above,
may be regarded crucial for the matter (Sailors & Sylvestre, 1994).
All financial data are deflated to prices of 1995. In order to enable a comparison
between small and large offices of the temp-agency we express all performance
measures per full-time equivalent (fte).
Table 1 shows the relevance of the choice for a particular performance measure. The
correlations between the four measures are indeed high, but not that high to be
11
interchangeable. Notably the net result differs from the others. In the table, one can
observe negative correlations between the performance measures and labor turnover.
This is a first and preliminary indication that the firm’s top management had a sound
intuition. Remarkably, the relation between labor turnover and net result is
considerably weaker than between turnover and the other three performance
measures. This is in line with our arguments presented above. More than in the other
measures, the positive effects of labor turnover are expressed in net result, e.g.
economizing on costs. Consequently, if the management of our temp-agency should
estimate the effects of turnover based on the three traditional measures, the
estimations of the disadvantages of turnover would be too high.





 temp          gross   net     labor
 hours sold sales          result   result     turnover
temp hours sold 1.00
sales   .90  1.00
margin realized     .84    .89         1.00
net result    .79    .81           .94   1.00
labor turnover –.45 –.42         –.39   –.23        1.00
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Two ensuing issues to discuss are the subjects of table 2. One could argue that it takes
some time before the effects of labor turnover can be observed in the firm’s
performance. Hence, we adjusted table 1 and did the accounting for two different, on
average subsequent periods of three years each. As a result, the negative correlations
between temp-hours sold, sales, gross result and labor turnover increased, while that
between net result and turnover remained about the same (row A). Because the degree
of difference in outcomes between table 1 and table 2 is rather small and does not
12
affect the testing of our hypothesis, below we will use the whole period 1995-1998
using the information in our data to the highest degree.
The second issue relates to the direction of the causal relationship. A critique to
the relation presented by us could be that it is not so much labor turnover that causes
performance but rather the other way around. This problem is the core of Koys’
analysis (Koys, 2001). Similar to his approach we used the division in three-year
periods in order to address this matter: in row B of table 2 we ‘mirrored’ the periods
in such a way that the performance measures now precede the variable labor turnover.
It can be clearly seen that the correlations decrease and loose significance. We
therefore feel safe to conclude that the performance measures are indeed effects of











hours sold sales result result
(A) labor turnover     –.51 ** –.48 ** –.47 ** –.25 **
(B) labor turnover     –.17 –.15 –.10 –.08
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
* p < .05 ** p < .01
  * !$*". How important correlations may be, sometimes they are
questionable. We have to beware of spurious relationships. In this respect, sickness
absenteeism asks for special attention. Labor turnover and sickness absenteeism may
be related if a common factor causes them – e.g. high work pressure or bad human
13
relations – obscuring the fact that the negative effects are totally caused by sickness
absenteeism and not by labor turnover. Therefore, it is crucial in an analysis of the
effects of labor turnover to control for sickness absenteeism. The problems involved
in controlling for this factor is one of the main causes that little is known about the
true effects of labor turnover. A second factor to be controlled for is the average age
per office because one may expect that younger people are more inclined to leave a
job (‘job hopping’) than elderly employees, whereas wages and salaries (and thus
employee costs) are age- related. Table 3 shows that the central variables used in the





minimum maximum      mean  deviation
labor turnover              4 %                  34 %          16.2 %    5.66
sickness absenteeism*         1 %                 14 %              3.9 %    2.08
average age (in years)       26                  43                  28.4    2.29
net result** – 32,183  199,563    77,547           37,496
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
* Sickness absenteeism: the total number of calendar days lost by sickness absenteeism per
office and per year (corrected for part time contracts of the employees involved) as a
percentage of the average number of persons employed in that office (no fte’s); pregnancy and
maternity leaves excluded.
77Dutch guilders per fte in prices of 1995$
The last factor we controlled for is the geographic region of the offices. Although the
Netherlands is a relatively small country, economic performance and economic
structure vary between parts of the country. One may expect these economic
differences to affect the results of the offices studied, as the temp business is strongly
dependent on the volume and nature of economic activities in its environment.
14
Besides, the vulnerability of offices for labor turnover may also be associated to the





labor turnover net result
1.  Periphery   15.3 % fl.  55,960 (N=20)
2.  Middle     14.2 % fl.  84,508 (N=43)
3.  Center   18.5 % fl.  80,365 (N=47)
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
In order to check these assumptions we divided the Netherlands in three regions: the
economic center, a middle part and the economic periphery. The economic center is
defined as the West of the country around the cities Rotterdam, The Hague and
Amsterdam, the so-called Randstad, while we consider the provinces of Groningen,
Friesland, Drenthe, Zeeland and parts of Limburg (south of Venlo) to belong to the
periphery; the middle area consists of the remaining parts of the Netherlands that also
happen to be about in the middle of the Dutch national territory. Following this
regional classification, 43 per cent of the offices is in the economic center, 39 per cent
in the middle area and 18 per cent in the periphery. Table 4 shows that there is indeed
a substantial regional effect in our data. Although the figures suggest that this effect
may not be strictly linear (highest net results in the middle part), we do not want to
capitalize on chance by adding a set of dummy variables. Conforming to the usual
interpretation of regional strength as a one-dimensional concept, we will add the
regional classification in the rank-order of Table 4 as a control variable to the
analysis.
15
 )"* &"$#$$ + Finally, we have to introduce curvilinearity in the analysis
because we hypothesized that only abnormal labor turnover has a negative effect on
office performance. This is done in the usual way by adding the squared term of labor
turnover to the analysis. If the basic relationship is negative – i.e. the office is on the
right side of the bell – and the more so when turnover increases, then the squared term
should pick this up and show the negative sign while the non-squared term becomes
positive.
Another problem to be solved is the issue whether the effect of labor turnover
manifests itself in the  of office performance or rather in the  of the latter.
The performance measures as defined above all relate to the average level of the
results of an office over a given time period. Differences in performance between
offices that originate from past influences and that are not captured by the control
variables may continue to have their effects on the variance of the dependent variable.
According to some, for this reason a  in performance is the preferred criterion.
Thus Baron $$ (2001: 1003-1007) analyze the rise in sales of Silicon Valley firms
by taking the sales of the first year of the period as a predictor for the sales in the last
year of the period. This is an adequate way of modeling the change of performance.
An additional advantage of this procedure is that, as a side effect, it also corrects for
other office-related variables that were not measured.
We do not prefer the one dependent variable to the other. Rather it is our
perspective that the assumed effect of labor turnover, if robust, will appear in both. In
order to test this robustness we analyzed the data in both ways. In table 5 the average
 of net result per office is used as the dependent variable; in table 6 we estimate
the  in results using the method applied by Baron $$ (2001). In the latter




In the analysis, we stepwise introduced the controls mentioned. The results are
presented in tables 5 and 6. The negative correlation we found between labor turnover
and net result (see table 1) holds if we control for age and sickness absenteeism and
even increases if we also consider the regional influence. In this third model, both
labor turnover and absenteeism and region have the expected – and significant1 –
effect on net result. The unstandardised regression coefficient indicates that an one
percent increase of labor turnover equals a loss of Dfl. 1780 (=   	
 	
which is about 2.25 per cent of one fte’s contribution to the net result. From a
management point of view, this is rather substantial. So the volume of labor turnover
indeed had negative effects for the firm studied.
In order to test whether the data support our ideas on the curvilinearity of the
relationship, we added labor turnover in model 4 as a squared term. If it is particularly
a  degree of labor turnover that is responsible for the effect in the dependent
variable, the squared term should capture the effect resulting in a change of sign of
the original variable. This is exactly what we observe in table 5 and table 6. Although
the total variance explained remains about the same, the breaking down of the
turnover variable points into the direction that it is predominantly an excessive degree
of turnover which has a negative effect on performance. Our second hypothesis is
therefore confirmed in the data. The testing also made clear that it is possible to
uncover the expected theoretical structure in the data on the condition that one can
apply the proper controls in the analysis. Not considering the obvious influences of
closely related variables like sickness absenteeism and regional strength may lead
HR-managers astray when conducting their own calculations ‘on the backside of a
cigar box’.
                                                     
1
 Because we use data of the total population, testing for statistical significance is strictly
speaking not necessary. However, because the years studied can be considered as a sample of
a larger number of years, we feel these tests are useful. Since the number of cases is rather




##1     #,,-%#,,.; 	 (<)
$
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
/	#,,-%#,,.    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
constant    102.752 114.329 106.387  87.041
labor turnover      –1552   –1293  –1778   1098
    (–.23 **) (–.20 *)           (–.27 ***)    ( .17 )
sickness absenteeism    –2602    –3389   –3330
  (–.15  )  (–.19 **) (–.19 *)
age   – 203    – 731   – 831
   (–.01 )      (–.05 )   (–.05 )
region    15066   15465
  ( .30 ***) ( .31***)
labor turnover (squared term)     –  87
   ( –.45 )
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
F       6.3 **    2.8 **      4.8 *** 4.1 ***
adj R2      .046    .048     .122 .126
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––








/	#,,3%#,,. Model 1      Model 2      Model 3      Model 4
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
constant 59.100         68.615  58.625         37.210
net result 1995   0,176           0,172   0,170         0,169
           (  .39 ***)    (   .38 ***) (  .38 ***)  ( .38***)
labor turnover   –793           –686   –1319           1896
(–.13 )         (–.12  )    (–.22 **)     ( .32 )
sickness absenteeism          –1255   –2284         –2225
         (–.08  )  (–.14 *)       (–.14 )
age          – 210    – 896        – 1007
          (–.01 )    (–.06 )       (–.07 )
region    19550         19998
( .43 ***)    ( .44 ***)
labor turnover (squared term)           –  97
        ( –.56 *)
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
F 12.7 ***         6.4 ***       11.8 *** 10.5 ***
adj R2 .176          .167       .332 .344
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01
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Whether the outcomes also support our first hypothesis on the bell-shaped form of the
relationship is a matter of debate. The fact that the sign of the linear term becomes
positive in both cases speaks in favor of this, but on the other hand,  the effects are far
from significant. This may be due to the fact that in this firm only a small number of
offices are suffering from a too low level of labor turnover. Calculation of the first
derivative from the coefficients in table 5 suggests the optimal turnover level in this
firm to be 6.3 per cent (1098/87*2). Only 5.5 per cent of the offices are below this
level. This would imply that in these data especially the right part of the bell-curve is
presented, so the curve cannot really be tested. We therefore conclude that our second
hypothesis is rejected nor confirmed, and that new research with fresh data should
shed more light on this matter.
	
“A survey last year by the American Management Association put turnover at the top
of bosses’ list of worries, with the majority saying that their retention concerns were
getting more serious each year”, so said The Economist (15 July 2000: 65). The
results of our research justify the bosses’ worries: we could empirically proof that
indeed a high degree of labor turnover negatively affected the economic performance
of the firm studied. However, it is the curvilinearity of the relationship that offers
hope to the bosses: it is not labor turnover as such, but rather an excessive degree of
turnover, which is of importance.
Our main conclusion must be reassuring for the authors who earn their livings by
writing HRM textbooks. In this literature, excessive labor turnover is often presented
as a fail factor be it that no hard empirical evidence is offered to the reader (Huselid,
1995). This omission is explained by the fact that hardly anything is known – or could
be known – about the empirical effects of labor turnover because of the inaccessibility
of relevant data sources: “Despite the importance of turnover, though, our knowledge
of it is surprisingly slight, and much of what is known comes only from the
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manufacturing sector” (Anderson & Meyer, 1994: 177). We were lucky to have
access to a unique data source in the modern service sector.
Our paper shows that labor turnover can have negative effects on firm
performance. Here we emphasize ‘can’ since economic performance is dependent on
many factors that are arranged differently for different types of firms in different
circumstances. This can also be seen in the fact that the relation between the variables
in our analysis is not very strong: even in the most elaborate model of Table 5
explained variance does not rise above 13 per cent. It is clear that indeed labor
turnover explains part of the variation in office performance but that the latter is
affected by unknown variables to a much larger degree.
We feel that we are only at the beginning of a new research agenda within the
domain of HRM. A first priority should be to make available new data bases that
provide opportunities for further testing of the hypothesis on the bell-shaped character
of the relationship between labor turnover and economic performance. The cultural
and structural layouts of firms like our temp agency with its many offices producing
the same product under similar conditions enable to control for relevant intervening
variables.
A second priority should be the specification of the relationship between
turnover and performance by type of HR-policy. Here we refer to an issue we touched
earlier at the end of the theory section of this article. More specifically, the question is
whether some types of organization are more ‘vulnerable’ to labor turnover than
others. We think the answer should be ‘yes’ because the costs of labor turnover partly
depend on the investments in human capital the employer is willing to make. In this
respect one could compare such polarities like high commitment HRM and more
Tayloristic oriented production processes where training periods are relatively short
and employees leaving the organization can be easily replaced (Bax, 2002). If such
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